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IN the normal course of business, United States citizens and corporations
have entered into contracts directly or indirectly involving commercial
relations with .alien citizens and corporations. Upon the outbreak of war
some of these aliens became our enemies, and continued performance of
contracts with them or for their benefit became unlawful without specific
license.'- Although non-resident enemy aliens are denied access to our courts
for the duration of the war,2 the running of the statute of limitations against
them is tolled for that period.3 A considerable amount of litigation may
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1. 40 STAT. 412 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. §3(a) (1940); General Ruling No. 11, as
amended, 8 FE. REG. 12287 (1943), 9 FED. REG. 7379 (1944).
2. 40 STAT. 417 (1917), id. at 1021 (1918), 50 U. S. C. App. § 7 (1940) ; Ex partc
Don Ascanio Colonna, 314 U. S. 510 (1942); Rothbarth v. Herzfeld, 179 App. Div. 865,
167 N. Y. Supp. 199 (1st Dep't 1917), aff'd without opinion, 223 N. Y. 578, 119 N. E. 1075
(1918). The denial applies equally to allies of enemies, who are not themselves at war with
this country. Sundell v. Lotmar Corp., 44 F. Supp. 816 (S. D. N. Y. 1942). Corporations
domiciled in enemy or enemy-occupied territory are barred. H. P. Drewry, S. A. R. L., v.
Onassis, 266 App. Div. 292, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 74 (1st Dep't 1943); cf. Sovfracht v. Van
Udens Scheepvaart. [1943] A. C. 203. But if a corporation in enemy-occupied terri-
tory has transferred its domicile to non-enemy territory by virtue of an emergency
decree and the governmnent-in-exile is recognized, the disability does not apply.
Chemacid, S. A., v. Ferrotar Corp., 51 F. Supp. 756 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); cf. The Pana,
[1943] 1 All Eng. Rep. 269 (P.). Enemy nationals not resident in enemy or enemy-
occupied territory are unrestricted in their access to the courts. Ex parte Kawato, 317
U. S. 69 (1942); Petition of Bernheimer, 130 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942); Clarke v.
Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 72 (N. Y. 1813). An enemy or ally of an enemy may defend an action
in our courts. 40 STAT. 417 (1917), id. at 1021 (1918), 50 U. S. C. App. § 7 (1940) ; The
Pietro Campahella, 47 F. Supp. 374 (D. Md. 1942); The Santa Lucia, 44 F. Supp. 793
(S. D. N. Y. 1942) ; State ex rel. Biering v. District Court, 140 P. (2d) 583 (Mfont. 1943).
Indeed, he must defend unless he can show that the state of war will materially impair
the conduct of the defense. Horvath v. Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, Ltd., 178 Misc. 52, 33
N. Y. S. (2d) 8 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
3. 40 STAT. 418 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 8 (1940) ; Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall 532 (U.
S. 1867); First National Bank v. Anglo-Oesterreichische Bank, 37 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A.
3d, 1930); Borovitz v. American Hard Rubber Co., 287 Fed. 368 (N. D. Ohio 1923) ;
Afric v. Alaska United Gold Mining Co., 6 Alaska 540 (1922) ; Kolundj lj a v. Hanna Mining
Ore Co., 155 Minn. 176, 193 N. W. 163 (1923) ; Siplyak v. Davis, 276 Pa. 49, 119 AtI. 745
(1923).
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therefore be anticipated to follow the resumption of relations with enemy
countries. The most pressing question may then be whether the outbreak
of war terminated the contractual obligations where enemies were involved,
or merely suspended them for the period during which the parties occupied
the status of belligerents.
Under Section 8 of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917," a United
States citizen or corporation may abrogate a contract with an enemy na-
tional, by serving notice upon the Alien Property Custodian, if the contract
falls into one of two specific categories. The first category includes all
agreements containing clauses which provide for their own cancellation or
acceleration on notice. Under the second class fall agreements providing
for the delivery of anything produced in the United States to an enemy or
ally of an enemy, either during or after the war. However, tile propriety
of identifying the Alien Property Custodian now in office by virtue of a
Presidential order " with the Alien Property Custodian created by Section
6 of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 0 is by no means clear. The
question of whether Section 8 is applicable to the present war has not yet
been adjudicated.7
It might have been anticipated that the determination of whether a con-
tract should be suspended rather than abrogated would turn upon the inter-
pretation of the language of Section 3 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy
Act,' which makes it "unlawful" to "trade" ' with an enemy or ally of an
enemy. Actually, however, only one reported case basing its decision on the
statute has been found.1" Since with this single exception the courts have
treated the problem as one of common law," this article will not deal with
the interpretation of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
4. 40 STAT. 418 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 8 (1940).
5. ExG. ORDER No. 9005, 7 Fan. RE. 1971 (1942) ; Exac. ORaDE No. 9193, 7 FED.
REG. 5205 (1942); Documrmrs PERTANInG To Fono,,x FUNDs CoNTnoL (U. S. Treas.
Dep't 1943) 10. The World War I Office of Alien Property Custodian was abolished and
its functions transferred to the Department of Justice by ExE_. Omzn No. C694 (1934).
These functions were transferred to the World War II Office of Alien Property Custndian
by ExEc. OR No. 9142, 7 FED. REG. 2985 (1942).
6. 40 STAT. 415 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 6 (1940).
7. See Dewey, Foreign Fiunds and Properly Control-The Powers and Dutlies of the
Alien Property Custodian (1943) 11 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 357, 365.
8. 40 STAT. 412 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 3(a) (1940).
9. Section 2 of the Act defines the words "to trade" to include "(c) Enter into, carry
on, complete, or perform any contract, agreement or obligation . .. (e) To have any
form of business or commercial communication or intercourse with." 40 STAT. 412 (1917),
50 U. S. C. App. § 2 (1940).
10. Compare Springer v. Garvan, 276 Fed. 595 (S. D. Ohio 1920) with s.c. on final
hearing, id. at 599.
11. Compare Strauss v. Schweizerische Kreditanstalt, 45 F. Supp. 449 (S. D. N. Y.
1942).
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One type of contract may be disposed of briefly at the outset. If the con-
tract is wholly executed on one side, so that the only remaining obligation
is the payment of a debt, that obligation is suspended for the duration of
the war and will revive upon the termination of hostilities.1" This rule
applies to debts which have been reduced to judgment,"3 to promissory
notes,14 and to a right of action for damages arising from a breach which
took place before the war.1 These situations involve remedies rather than
rights, in the sense that payment rather than performance is sought. The
distinction is an important one,"" because it makes the issues in these cases
resemble problems of adjective law. Courts will suspend what is left of
such contracts without intellectual difficulties, in much the same manner as
the "right" of access to the court is treated.'
On the other hand, cases involving incomplete performance of the pri-
mary obligation-that is, executory contracts in the strict sense-have
called forth involved, confusing opinions 18 with a variety of results. An
English critic suggests that, "A good deal of confusion has been introduced
in this matter by premature attempts to generalize before enough cases had
arisen to enable a general outline of the relevant principles to be worked
out." '" With fewer wars in our own history, the criticism is applicable
with at least as much force to the American cases. Nevertheless, since the
British and American courts adopted very divergent approaches and evolved
the law differently, the law in each country is better discussed separately.
THE AMERICAN CASES
The acknowledged ancestor of almost all American cases dealing with
the effect of war on executory contracts is a lengthy and excessively learned
opinion by Chancellor Kent of New York."0 He decided merely that tran-
12. Zimmerman v. Hicks, 7 F. (2d) 443 -(C. C. A. 2d, 1925), aff'd sub nor. Zim-
merman v. Sutherland, 274 U. S. 253 (1927) ; see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93
U. S. 24, 31 (1876) ; Neumond v. Farmers Feed Co., 244 N. Y. 202, 206, 155 N. E. 100
(1926) ; WILLIsToN, CoNTRAcrs (rev. ed. 1936) § 1748. The English cases are in accord;
Flindt v. Waters, 15 East 260, 104 Eng. Rep. R. 842 (K. B. 1812) ; Ex parte Boussmaker,
13 Ves. 71, 34 Eng. Rep. R. 221 (Ch. 1806); see Zinc Corporation v. Hirsch, [1916)
1 K. B. 541, 556 (C. A.).
13. Birge-Forbes Co. v. Heye, 251 U. S. 317 (1920).
14. See Rhederei A. G. v. Clutha Shipping Co., 226 Fed. 339, 342 (D. Md. 1915).
15. See Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co., [1918] A. C. 260, 269.
16. Compare McNair, Effect of War upon Contracts (1942) 27 TRANSAcTIOS GRo-
TIuS SocETY 182, 183, 200.
17. See note 2 mpra.
18. Compare Hall, Effect of War on Contracts (1918) 18 CoL. L. Ray. 325, 344.
19. McNair, supra note 16, at 183.
20. Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438 (N. Y. 1819) ; cf. The Rapid, 8 Cranch
155 (U. S. 1814).
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sactions in commercial paper between citizens of the United States and Great
Britain during the War of 1812 were void; but in the course of his opinion,
the Chancellor reviewed cases and text-writers in America, England and the
European continent, thus producing dicta which have stimulated judges
ever since. Kent traced Anglo-American jurisprudence on the subject back
to the Black Book of the Admiralty, whose origin has been lost in the mists
of antiquity.2 This venerable authority, as quoted by Kent, declares in Law
French that those who "entrecommunent" with the enemy commit an un-
lawful act. The English equivalent would presumably be "commune with"
or "intercommunicate," but Kent states that the prohibition has always
been restricted to intercourse of a commercial character. He bases these
views on the theory that a war is between the individual citizens of the
nations involved, not merely their governments,22 finding support in the
proposition that a partnership is dissolved by an outbreak of war between
the governments of which the partners are citizens.2
Numerous courts have followed the Chancellor's precedent of expand-
ing on the subject obiter. Thus one finds many broad statements of this
nature:
"By the settled law and policy of this country all executory contracts
with enemies of the United States . . .are abrogated by the declara-
tion of war between this country and such enemy." 2 4
In fact, an examination of the cases reveals that such language was not at
all necessary to their decision, and that the law is actually much more re-
stricted. In this country the general rule appears to be that executory con-
tracts are merely suspended by the outbreak of war; those declared void
are the exceptions.25
This result has been reached on what may be called a psycholugical basis.
Underlying the development of the law concerning trading with the enemy
is a feeling that courts should tend to mitigate the harshness of war in its
effects on private rights and duties. "The whole tendency of modern law
and practice," said the Supreme Court in 1926, "is to soften the 'ancient
severities of war,' and to recognize, increasingly, that the nurmal interrela-
tions of the citizens of the respective belligerents are not to be interfered
21. 1 BouviER, LAW Dic o .Ry (1914 ed.) 366 indicates the doubt, but assigns the
work to the reign of Edward III (1327-1377).
22. Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 446-449 (N. Y. 1819) ; cf. Sutherland v.
Mayer, 271 U. S. 272, 287 (1926).
23. Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 488 et seq. (N. Y. 1819).
24. Rossie v. Garvan, 274 Fed. 447,450 (D. Conn. 1921); cf. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall
532 (U. S. 1867) ; The William Bagaley, 5 Wall 377 (U. S. 1866) ; Pedrick and Springfield,
War Measures and Contract Liability (1942) 20 Tx.. L. RIv. 710, 731-2.
25. Compare HuacH, TRmxG wTH nE E,;Esy (1918) 261.
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with when such interference is unncessary to the successful prosecution of
the war." 2
It has been suggested that the temperate attitude of 'the United States
towards enemies developed early because we are "a country whose life-
blood came from an immigrant stream." 2 The War of 1812, for example,
found many natives of England fighting on the American side.2" The
Civil War and the general amnesty granted by the President after the rebel-
lion had ceased apparently furthered this sentimental attitude. The "citi-
zens" of the Confederate States were also citizens of the United States ;20
war gave them the status of alien enemies only temporarily. Under such
circumstances, judges naturally favored-wittingly or not-reinstatement
of the status quo ante bellum wherever possible.80 Immediately after World
War I, it is true, courts might have been expected to be stricter. Sentimen-
tal considerations should not have been present because in that conflict, the
alien status of our enemies was clear, and, more significantly, the value and
the mechanics of economic warfare were more fully understood.0' Never-
theless, the sentimental. attitude had become ingrained and had acquired
the force of precedent. It colored the Senate report on the Trading with
the Enemy Act of 1917 82 and persists today.8
As a corollary to the policy of mitigating the harshness of war, there is
implicit in the decisions a tendency to preserve executory contracts when-
ever possible without conflicting with'the absolute requirements of a state
of hostilities. In effect, many courts appear to consider executory con-
tracts in general as presumptively subject to suspension rather than can-
cellation.34 Other courts may be motivated by a desire to give the benefit
of the doubt to an American citizen in preference to a former enemy.
In effectuating these policies, courts have often justified their result by
relying on the "presumed intention" of the contracting parties. Some
cases, for example, contain elaborate discussions of the intended disposi-
26. Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272, 287-288 (1926) ; cf. Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100
Mass. 561, 573 (1868) ; Cohen v. New York Mutual Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 610, 622 (1872).
27. See Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 73 (1942).
28. Ibid. and authorities cited.
29. Compare Littauer, Confiscation of the Property of Technical Enemies (1943) 52
YALE L. J. 739, 746.
30. See Cohen v. New York Mutual Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 610, 620 (1872).
31. H. R. REP. No. 85, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917) 2.
32. SFN. REP. No. 111, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917) 1, stating that the purpose of the
act was "to mitigate the rules of law which prohibit all intercourse between the citizens
of warring nations, and to permit, under careful safeguards and restrictions, certain kinds
of business to be carried on." The House report, supra note 31, is a curious mixture of this
view and a recognition of the importance of economic warfare.
33. See Ex pare Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 76-7 (1942).
34. See Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Hillyard, 37 N.J. Law 444, 468-9 (1874); Sands
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626, 635 (1872).
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tion of the subject matter of the contract. But from the wording of the
instrument itself, it is often not clear that the parties actually meant what
the court assumes they did.3"
Since it is ordinarily the exceptional case which gives rise to litigation,
the language of the decisions does not indicate that suspension is the gen-
eral rule. Even in cases where the court purported to suspend the agree-
ments, the ultimate result has been termination. Thus in two cases the
court held that the obligations were suspended for the duration, but went
on to say that whether or not they should be revived depended upon equit-
able considerations.30 But inasmuch as neither contract was actually revived
by the court, the result is indistinguishable from that reached in cases hold-
ing contracts terminated by the outbreak of war. However, since it
appears that executory contracts judicially nullified or terminated fall into
restricted categories, the effect of the United States' decisions would seem
to be that the ordinary contract involving trading with the enemy is merely
suspended.
Contracts Terminated. Executory contracts actually terminated or nulli-
fied by the outbreak of war fall into two main categories: (1) contracts
whose delayed performance would thwart the purpose of the parties, and
(2) contracts whose suspension would interfere with the conduct of the
war. In an attempt to establish the boundaries of the general rule, illus-
trative situations in each class of exceptions will be considered.
Cases holding that contracts whose delayed performance would thwart
the purpose of the parties should be terminated, are actually decided on
principles of impossibility of performance. Merely to suspend for the dura-
tion of the war agreements requiring performance at a more or less definite
future time would defeat their purpose, or at least impair the value of the
bargain materially. Such contracts are therefore terminated by the out-
break of war.
Contracts of affreightment are peculiarly of this nature.37 One such
case 38 goes on the expressed ground that there can be no possible estimate
35. E. g., Maurer Co. v. Tubeless Ti4 Co., 285 Fed. 713 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) ; Heid-
ner v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 124 Wash. 652, 215 Pac. 1 (1923), cert. don icd, 263
U. S. 721 (1924) ; cf. Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55 (1897) ; Zimmerman v. Rozssler, 246
App. Div. 306, 289 N. Y. S. (2d) 401 (1st Dep't 1935), off'd uithout ophinon, 272 N. Y.
566, 4 N. E. (2d) 739 (1936).
A simila device has been used to decide against a party who sustains a particular
view in order to escape from a bad bargain. See Erdreich v. Zimmerman, 190 App. Div.
443, 179 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1st Dep't 1926).
36. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24 (1876); Neumond v. Farmers
Feed Co., 244 N. Y. 202, 155 N. E. 100 (1926).
37. See Allanwilde Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S. 377 (1919); cf. The Kron-
prinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. 12 (1917).
38. Allanwilde Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S. 377 (1919).
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of the length of the war. From this premise, the court developed a ruling
that the act of one of the parties in repudiation of the contract was justified.
This theory was perhaps appropriate to a decision based, as in many of the
English cases, 30 on the doctrine of commercial frustration ;40 but it would
appear to be an unnecessarily flimsy basis for a general statement that all
executory contracts should be treated as terminated by war.41 It would
seem that the court need go no farther than to say that a party is justified
in acting on the assumption that any war is of uncertain duration, and hence
would refrain from penalizing him for a bad guess unless he did not behave
as a reasonable man under the circumstances. 42
When a supply contract calls for regular shipments at stipulated times,
it obviously falls within this first classification. Since delayed perform-
ance will not be in accord with the purpose of the parties, the contract will
be held cancelled by war.4" Occasionally, where no specific time is fixed, the
court will hold that shipment in a reasonable time is an implied term in the
contract, and treat it as terminated on that basis.44 In one of the few Ameri-
can cases thus ftr litigated in World War II, the contract called for a sup-
ply of the buyer's requirements of a particular commodity over a ten-year
period which had not yet commenced when war began. Although the only
question presented for decision was one of federal jurisdiction, the court
clearly intimated in its opinion that itobelieved the contract had been dis-
solved.4
Contracts requiring more or less continuous commercial intercourse
between the parties are also in this first class of exceptions to the general
rule. A partnership agreement between persons whose status becomes that
of reciprocal enemies is the clearest example of this type. Since an interna-
tional partnership virtually requires constant communication and ordinarily
functions by means of frequent transfers of credit and shipments of mer-
chandise, such an agreement is dissolved ipso facto by a declaration of
war.
46
39. See Esposito v. Bowden, 7 E. & B. 763, 792, 119 Eng. Rep. R. 1440 (Q. B. 1857);
Geipel v. Smith, L. R. 7 Q. B. 404, 414 (1872).
40. See McNair, Frustration of Contract by War (1940) 56 L. Q. REV. 173, 203.
41. But see Pedrick and Springfield, stepra note 24, at 731-2.
42. Compare McNair, supra note 40, at 205.
43. Maurer Co. v. Tubeless Tire Co., 285 Fed. 713 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922).
44. Heidner v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 124 Wash. 652, 215 Pac. 1 (1923),
cert. denied, 263 U. S. 721 (1924).
45. Strauss v. Schweizerische Kreditanstalt, 45 F. Supp. 449 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
46. $utherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272, 286, 289 (1926); The William Baigaley, 5 Wall.
377 (U. S. 1866) ; Mayer v. Garvan, 278 Fed. 27 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922) ; Rossie v. Garvan,
274 Fed. 447 (D. Conn. 1921) ; see Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532 (U. S. 1867) ; Sorenson v.
Sutherland, 27 F. Supp. 44 (S. D. N. Y. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 109 F. (2d) 714
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940), aff'd sub. nori. Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U. S. 494 (1941) ;
Monsseaux v. Urquhart, 19 La. Annual Rep. 482,486 (1867) ; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v.
Hillyard, 37 N. J. Law 444 (1874) ; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 488 ff. (N. Y.
1819); Cohen vr. New York Mutual Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 610 (1872).
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Numerous statements have been made to the effect that contracts which
"necessarily involve intercourse" with an enemy are "dissolved and ter-
minated" by the commencement of hostilities,4 7 but even the partnership
cases have been questioned as too dogmatic in this connection.4" The mod-
em view is to suspend such contracts when the commercial arrangements
are such that the business interrupted by the war can, without thwarting
the essential purpose of the partners, be resumed aftgr the treaty of peace
has been concluded.49
The general principle which emerges from the decisions is that a contract
will be terminated only if suspension for the period of the war would involve
a substantial alteration of its terms, materially increasing the burden of
performance.50 Statements that agreements which "necessarily involve in-
tercourse" are nullified r' are merely a misleading phrasing of the same
view. Whether or not frequent intercourse was required during the normal
peace-time operation of the contract is not controlling 2 The contract will
be dissolved only when suspension of commercial intercourse will substan-
tially affect the terms of the bargain 13 and the very fact of non-perform-
ance during the war deprives the other party of the consideration for which
he bargained.' The problem is actually one of temporary supervening im-
possibility; if delayed performance cannot fairly be considered equivalent
to the performance specified the contract is discliarged. ' 5
The second category of contracts held terminated by the war consists of
those whose suspension would interfere with the conduct of the war. Cases
47. See, e.g., Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Miller, 297 Fed. 404, 410 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924);
aff'd, 268 U. S. 552 (1925).
48. See Huaacu, op. cit. supra note 25, at M-290.
49. Ibid.
50. Compare WILLIsToN, CoNtRcrs §§ 1743, 1958; RESTT E=LIr, CorrAc'Ts
(1932) § 596(c) ; Horton, Effects of War on Contracts (1942) 10 Gwo. WAsH. L. R.v. 943,
947-8.
51. e.g., Moore, Force Majeure, in M&%nss, THE TuDiuzG WITH TH E.,'Au Acr
(1924) 445, 461.
52. Compare Hummca, op. cit. supra note 25, at 306.
53. Although it is weak authority and subject to conflicting interpretations, reference
must be made to Hodgskin v. United States, 279 Fed. 85 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922), a criminal
prosecution for conspiracy" to defraud the United States. It involved a contract between
a German corporation and its American subsidiary, under which the German parent
company had agreed to supply patent rights, know-how, etc., to the American company,
which manufactured products in this country. The bulk of the profits made by the sub-
sidiary was payable directly to the German company, not merely by way of dividends on
its stock. The German company had the right to choose the top personnel of the American
company. The trial judge charged that this contract had been abrogated ipso facto by
the declaration of war in 1917. The conviction was affirmed, but this portion of the
charge was not assigned as error on the appeal.
54. Compare Hall, supra note 18, at 344.
55. Compare Wade, The Principle of Inpossibility in Contract (1940) 56 L. Q. R w.
519, 554-555.
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involving these contracts are actually decided on principles of illegality of
performance. The rule is based on the obvious undesirability of aiding the
enemy, either directly, by putting things of value in his hands; or indirectly
by immobilizing resources or restricting the freedom of action of the con-
tracting party.
For example, a joint venture requiring the shipmentof American cotton
to a neutral port to be held there for the account of an enemy firm until
peace should be declared, was held abrogated by the entrance of the United
States into World War I." The theory of the case was that performance of
the contract would have prevented the resources of a warring nation from
being employed in its own behalf. Somewhat similar, though less dramatic,
was the plight of the American shareholders who had executed an option
agreement giving enemy nationals the exclusive right to purchase the stock
of a corporation located in the United States. This contract was held ter-
minated by the war on the ground that- it prevented freedom of action by
American citizens.5 7
Gratuitous statements confirming the principle are readily available. The
Supreme Court has said, for example, that the basic purpose of prohibiting
trade with the enemy is "to preclude the possibility of aid or comfort, direct
or indirect, to the opposing forces." 5 It should be noted, however, that
cases of this general nature tend to be based on spurious reasoning. To say
that performance of a contract will'aid or comfort the enemy is not neces-
sarily equivalent to saying that the contract must be terminated rather than
suspended. To be consistent with the underlying principle, the only type
of contract which should be abrogated on this basis is one whose suspension
will interfere with the conduct of the war." Among the American cases,
such a situation was present only in the two discussed above.00
A state court attempted to rest one recent decision " in part on the ground
that aid to the enemy was involved, but in view of the facts involved this
approach appears questionable with respect to this part of the decision. An
American buyer had contracted to purchase certain equipment from an
American supplier, specifying that the equipment was to be exported to a
subsequent purchaser in Japan. In concluding that the contract of resale
56. Joring v. Harriss, 292 Fed. 974 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 263 U. S. 710
(1923).
57. Matheson v. Hicks, 10 F. (2d) 872 (E. D. N. Y. 1926).
58. Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272, 287 (1926); cf. Second Russian Ins. Co. v.
Miller, 297 Fed. 404, 410 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), aff'd. 268 U. S. 552 (1925); Kershaw v.
Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561, 572-573 (1868) ; Sands v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 626
(1872).
59. Compare WLLISTON, CoNRcs § 1748; RESTATEMEN , CoNTRAcTs §§ 594, 596(b).
60. Joring v. Vams, 292 Fed. 974 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 263 U. S. 710
(1923) ; Matheson v. Hidis, 10 F. (2d) 872 (E. D. N. Y. 1926).
61. Takahashi v. Pepper Tank Co., 58 Wyo. 330, 131 P. (2d) 339 (1942).
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was dissolved by the outbreak of war and that the original supplier was
relieved of his obligation, the court relied on the theory, stated without
extended consideration, that the contract contemplated supplying an enemy
with materials useful in preparation for war.62 There was no discussion of
the alternative *of suspending the contract for the duration. The court
apparently had in mind the type of general statement uttered in cases hold-
ing that a contract must be held void because the enemy would be aided if
performance were permitted.' To decide a case of this nature on such a
basis seems utterly unrealistic. Japan would undoubtedly have been helped
if the shipment had been completed, but the chance of its completion was
less than ephemeral. To be sure, there was a theoretical possibility of ob-
taining a license to trade with the enemy,' and conceivably the case could
have arisen in such a way that the gesture of applying for such a license
would have had to be established. But if the court assumed a real possibility
of obtaining the license, it would be taking the inconsistent position of pre-
suming to nullify in advance an act of the executive authorizing the ship-
ment.
The case is actually a good example of a contract which should be sus-
pended unless suspension would thwart the purpose of the parties. The
argument in favor of termination, as opposed to suspension, would be the
desirability of foreclosing to Japan the possibility of obtaining the goods
after the war. Such an argument, however, appears inconsistent with
general civilized principles as well as with the thoroughly established Anglo-
American rule that a contract fully executed on one side-where nothing
remains unperformed except the payment of money-is merely suspend-
ed.65 Under the latter rule, the obligation revives automatically at the
end of the war, and the former enemy can collect his debt. This decision,
therefore, does not seem supportable on the ground of interfering with
the conduct of the war." It should be repeated, however, that the court had
available entirely satisfactory alternative theories, which would support its
decisions on the particular facts involved.
Contracts Suspended. Contracts held suspended, rather than terminated,
by the outbreak of war also fall into groups. The most familiar type is
the contract of life insurance. Although there are indications to the con-
trary, the overwhelming weight of authority refuses to treat a life insur-
62. Id. at 363, 131 P. (2d) 339 at 352.
63. See cases cited, note 1 supra.
64. See sources cited note 1 mipra.
65. See Neumond v. Farmers Feed Co., 244 N. Y. 202, 206, 155 N. E. 100 (1926);
and other cases cited suPra notes 12-15.
66. The English courts have a somewhat different approach. See discussion page ...
infra.
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ance contract as dissolved by the war." The rationale is that the contracts
are not commercial in nature and require communication between the par-
ties only for the payment of premiums, an obligation which can be sus-
pended until after the war without serious consequences to either side.
A second type of contract which should in general be suspended is the
contract of agency. Actually, numerous agency contracts have been held
completely unaffected by the outbreak of hostilities. In order to avoid both
termination and suspension, according to a recent case, the contract must
meet these requirements: (1) communication with the enemy must not be
required or have occurred, directly or indirectly; and (2) circumstances
must disclose the principal's assent to the continued existence of the agency
in the event of 'war. Such consent will be implied if continuance of the
agency is to the benefit of the principal.08
Favored treatment for agency contracts with enemy principals developed
from early cases involving the questiop of whether interest was suspended
by the outbreak of war. It was held in 1818, for example, that interest
should be paid to the resident agent of an enemy principal for the periods
covered by the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812.9 If a judgment
for interest.during the war could be obtained, it was reasoned, the agency
itself continued despite the outbreak of hostilities. Safeguards were found
in the fact that no commercial intercourse across the line of hostilities was
involved."° Thus it has been held that a power of attorney to sell land was
not affected by the outbreak of the Civil War, 1 and that proxies to vote
corporate stock remain effective during hostilities.72 But the commence-
ment of war may produce such a fundamental alteration in the relations of
67. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Hillyard, 37 N. J. Law 444 (1874) ; Cohen v. New
York Mutual Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 610 (1872) ; Sands v. New York Life Ins. Co., 50 N. Y.
626 (1872). But see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24 (1876) ; cf. Hunminuc,
op. cit. mtpra note 25, at 296, stating that this case "is not an authority for the propo-
sition that war terminates a contract of life insurance."
68. Aldridge v. Franco-Wyoming Securities Corp., 31 A. (2d)246, 251 (Del. Ch.
1943).
69. Conn. v. Pa., 6 Fed. Cas. 282 (C. C. D. Pa. 1818).
70. See Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272, 288 (1926). Contracts have been held
both suspended and completely unaffected on this ground.. Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass.
561 (1868) (lease between enemies both on same side of line of hostilities held unaffected
by war); Springer v. Garvan, 276 Fed. 595 (S. D. Ohio 1920) (contract with enemy to
support relatives was here held unaffected; but see s. c. on final hearing, id. at 599);
Vorhaus v. City Nat. Securities Co., 167 N. Y. Supp. 736 Sup. Ct. Dep't 1917), aff'd without
opinion, 182 App. Div. 922, 169 N. Y. Supp. 1118 (1st Dep't 1918) (trust agreement held
suspended). I
71. Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55 (1897).
72. Aldridge v. Franco-Wyoming Securities Corp., 31 A. (2d) 246 (Del. Ch. 1943);
Monsseaux v. Urquhart, 19 La. Annual Rep. 482 (1867).
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the parties that the continued authority of an agent will not be assumed in
the absence of evidence of the principal's assent.73
The interests of society may require that agency contracts continue, de-
spite the outbreak of war, where the supervision of property is necessary
to protect it from depreciation ;4 but the ordinary agency contract would
seem to require special treatment by the courts no more than does the ordi-
nary commercial contract. A preferable approach is that recently adopted
by a New York court. Finding that a power of attorney had been issued
to a citizen of the United States by a citizen of Germany residing there, the
court made no inquiry into the necessity of communicating across the line
of hostilities, but simply ruled that the contract had been suspended by this
country's entrance into World War 11. 71 Agency contracts in general seem
to be proper cases for suspension.
The great majority of ordinary commercial agreements, other than those
requiring performance at a particular time, also belong in the group of con-
tracts suspended by war. This group would include patent licenses, agree-
ments for the interchange of technical information, long-term supply con-
tracts, royalty agreements, under copyrights and the like.
Provisions to Operate in the Event of War. Of particular interest are the
cases involving the effect of agreements containing specific provisions to
operate in the event of war. In one such case, a German firm had agreed
with its American partner, who operated 'a branch house in this country,
that if war should be declared the German and American establishments
should become separate enterprises automatically. A sentence from the
court's opinion summarizes the decision:
"The German partners could make no agreement with the com-
plainant after a declaration of war that would be recognized as valid
in our courts, and therefore no executory agreement entered into
before the var, and in contemplation of it, could be effective to trans-
fer their interest to him [the American partner] ... after war had been
declared." 71
A vigorous dissent argued that the agreement took effect eo instanti with
the declaration of war, and that the provision in the contract providing for
separation of the business was not against public policy.7
73. Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272, 297 (1926) ; cf. Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S.
55, 73 (1897).
74. See Monsseaux v. Urquhart, 19 La. Annual Rep. 482, 486 (1867).
75. In, re Walz, 181 Misc. 511, 46 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 589 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
76. Mayer v. Garvan, 278 Fed. 27, 33 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922).
77. Id. at 35-41.
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On a different set of facts, a New York court adopted the contrary atti-
tude.78 A contract between an individual and a securities firm, both located
in this country, for the purchase by the defendant of German marks for
future delivery,70 provided that payment was to be delayed if "wireless
should be interrupted." Taking judicial notice of the political situation at
the time the contract was made, which included the possibility of United
States' involvement in war, the court construed the quoted language to be
equivalent to, or at least to include, "war should be declared." The court
gave effect to the clause, holding the defendant liable for the agreed price
A vigorous dissent argued that the agreement took effect eo instanti with
after communications with Germany had been reestablished following the
armistice.
It should be noted, however, that this case is not direct authority with
respect to executory contracts, because the court also found that a sale of
the marks had taken place before the declaration of war. Unfortunately,
no American case has ruled directly on an executory contract containing a
simple suspension clause to become operative automatically in the event of
war. 8  To be consistent with the principles already stated, the contract
should be treated as if it contained no such clause. If the contract can be
suspended without either thwarting the purpose of the parties or interfer-
ing with the conduct of the war, it should be considered suspended. If not,
it should be termindted without regard to the suspension clause. Such a
clause is entitled to some weight'as an indication that the parties themselves
contemplated suspension as an event which would not thwart their essen-
tial purpose. If suspending the contract would interfere with the conduct
of the war, the suspension clause should be considered void as against pub-
lic policy, and the entire contract abrogated on that basis.
Two apparently anomalous cases may be explained by the manner in
which they arose. United States v. Hamburg-Anzerikanische Packctfahrt-
A.G."' was an antitrust action which reached the Supreme Court after the
outbreak of World War I in Europe, but prior to this country's entry.
An agreement in restraint of trade in ocean carriage was alleged to exist
among American, British, German and other foreign companies. The
court, taking judicial notice of the European war, dismissed th Govern-
ment's case without prejudice, on the express ground that the question in-
volved in the action had become moot as "an inevitable legal consequence"
78. Zimmerman v. Roessler, 246 App. Div. 306, 284 N. Y. Supp. 409 (1st Dep't
1935), aff'd without opinion, 272 N. Y. 566, 4 N. E. (2d) 739 (1936).
79. Compare Erdreich v. Zimmerman, 190 App. Div. 443, 179 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1st
Dep't 1920).
80. But cf. Rossie v. Garvan, 274 Fed. 447, 452 (D. Conn. 1921) (holding that to
treat a standard force mnajeure clause as sufficient to dissolve an executory contract would
be against public policy).
81. 239 U. S. 466 (1916).
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of the war." Shortly thereafter, another antitrust action arose involving
a situation almost identical in outline.83 The contracting parties were Ameri-
can, British and German and the alleged restraint of trade was with regard
to ocean carriage. The lower court dismissed the bills of complaint on the
merits." The Government moved in the Supreme Court for an order dis-
missing the bills without prejudice on the ground that the existence of the
European war made the question moot at the time the decrees were entered
below, and specifically requested application of "the doctrine announced in
the Hamburg-American case." 85 Ruling that the contracts had been dis-
solved "as the result of the European War," the Supreme Court entered
the requested order.
It should be noted that at the time either of these cases was decided the
United States had not entered the war. Furthermore, no extended consid-
eration was given in either case to the legal principles involved, because
none was required. Although in the later case the court stated that the con-
tracts had been dissolved and that it was applying the rule of the Hamnzlrg-
American case, the Hamburg-American case did not itself contain any state-
ment to the effect that dissolution had been effected by the war. The decision
apparently proceeded on the ground that the business of the parties had
ceased, regardless of whether the contract itself was affected by the war. 0
Moreover, the cases did not involve any rights of the parties under the con-
tracts. Indeed, both cases recognized that the conditions complained of by
the Government might recur after the war and result in a renewal of the
antitrust actions.
THE ENGLISH CASES
The law on executory contracts involving trade with an enemy has devel-
oped with much greater clarity in Great Britain than in the United States.
Moreover, the English courts have taken a harsher view, establishing can-
cellation rather than suspension of the contract as the general rule. One
reason for the difference is probably the fact that English courts were not
subject to the tempering effect which the WVar of 1812 ST and the Civil
War 8 appear to have had on the development of the American law. Fur-
82. Id. at 475.
83. United States v. American-Asiatic S. S. Co., 242 U. S. 537 (1917).
84. 220 Fed. 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
85. United States v. American-Asiatic S. S. Co., 242 U. S. 537, 538 (1917).
86. 239 U. S. at 477; cf. Richards v. Wreschner, 174 App. Div. 484, 156 N. Y. Supp.
1054 (1st Dep't 1916), holding, before the United States entered World War I, that a
German company's inability to ship antimony from Belgium to the United States ecause
of a state of war between Belgium and Germany was merely impossibility of performance
due to foreign law which did not excuse the obligor.
87. See Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 73 (1942).
88. Littauer, loc. cit. supra note 29.
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ther, England sustained the propriety of confiscating enemy property in
addition to contraband of war at a much earlier date than the United
States."'
British judges recognize two types of situations which may arise when
the parties to an executory contract become enemies. Either continued
performance of the contract will involve intercourse with the enemy, or its
continued existence will confer upon the enemy an immediate or future
benefit." On either theory, the contract is declared terminated by the out-
break of hostilities.
The legal technique used in many of the English cases for reaching such
a decision is the doctrine of commercial frustration. This theory assumes
that war constitutes such a supervening impossibility that reasonable men
could not have entered into the bargain expressed in the contract if they had
contemplated the event of war. Admittedly resorting to a fiction, the court
then holds that the contract contains an "implied term" providing for its
own dissolution upon the happening of the event. 1 A distinguished writer
has recently expressed the reasoning in the following language:
"It is submitted that the test can be stated as follows: Would a
reasonable man in the position of the party alleging frustration, after
taking all reasonable steps to ascertain the facts then available, and
without snapping at the opportunity of extricating himself from the
contract, come to the conclusion that the interruption was of such a
character and was likely to last so long that the performance or further
performance of the contract would really amount to the performance
of a new contract? If so, there is frustration. And in considering the
probability of the duration he is entitled to assume that in so far as the
outbreak or the existence of a war is the cause of the interruption that
cause is of uncertain duration. Moreover, the Court will not let him
suffer for a determination thus reached if subsequent unexpected
events show that he was unduly pessimistic in his forecast." 02
89. Id. at 747.
90. In re Badische Co., [1921] 2 Ch. 331.
91. Id. at 379-380; cf. Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue S. S. Co., [1926] A. C. 497, 507, 510
(P. C.) ; Bank Line v. Arthur Capel & Co., [1919] A. C. 435, 455; Metropolitan Water Board
v. Dick, Kerr & Co., [1918] A. C. 119, 127, 131; Tamplin S. S. Co. v. Anglo-Mexican
Petroleum Co., [1916] 2 A. C. 397, 403; cf. Allanwilde Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U. S.
377 (1919). There are other theories for the doctrine of commercial frustration, but they
have all been reconciled with the "implied term." See McNair, supra note 40, at 178-182.
With particular reference to the question of damages, see Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v.
Fairbairn Lawson Combs Barbour, Ltd., [1943] A. C. 32, overruling Chandler v. Webster,
[1904] 1 K. B. 493 (C. A.) and the line of authority developed from the "Coronation cases."
Cf. Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 GEG. VI, c. 40, which was enacted
in response to the suggestion in the Fibrosa case, supra, that legislative clarification was
advisable.
92. McNair, supra note 40, at 205.
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If it is not held abrogated by its own "implied term," a British court will,
-with rare exceptions, declare the contract void on the ground that the enemy
will be benefited by its continued existence. This result is reached even when
it is contrary to the express intention of the parties, as where the contract
contains a clause specifically calling for suspension rather than cancellation.
Such a clause is held void as against public policy on the theory that it is
intended to suspend merely the deliveries required under the contract, thus
leaving open the necessity-or at least the possibility-of communicating
with the enemy.13 The leading case on this aspect of the problem bases its
decision also on the theory that suspension would tie the hands of the Brit-
ish party to the contract by requiring it to maintain an inventory position
sufficient to permit the supply of the required goods as soon as the war ter-
minated 9 4-- a condition deemed to interfere substantially with Britain's
conduct of the war. In view of the basis for the rule, it may be doubted
whether the latter theory would have entered British law if the British com-
pany had been the purchaser rather than the supplier of the goods. Simi-
larly, doubt may be expressed concerning the validity of an approach based
on theoretical benefits accruing to the enemy,0 5 especially if the enemy is a
vendor rather than a vendee. It would seem somewhat unrealistic to deter-
mine a case of this nature on the ground that the enemy's war potential is
increased because the enemy party's credit position is improved by the knowl-
edge that his rights under the contract will reacquire all their original virility
with the coming of peace. Still, the sense of the English cases is that "... the
suspension of performance until after the war would confer the present
value of a post-war benefit upon the enemy .... ,, 00
There has been some criticism of the basis for this approach. For
example, the Court of Appeal in 1916 said: "The prohibition against doing
anything for the benefit of an enemy contemplates his benefit during the
war and not the possible advantage he may gain when peace comes." 0
The extent to which the rule should apply has also been questioned. 3
93. Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co., [1918] A. C. 260.
94. Ibid.; cf. Zinc Corporation v. Hirsch, [1916] 1 K. B. 541 (C. A.). The line of
authority includes Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 V. B. 857, 866 (C. A.); Robson v.
Premier Oil Co., [1915] 2 Ch. 124 (C. A.); Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines,
[1902] A. C. 484; Esposito v. Bowden, 7 E. & B. 762, 119 Eng. Rep. R. 1430 (Q. B. 1857);
Furtado v. Rogers, 3 Bos. & P. 191, 127 Eng. Rep. R. 105 (C. P. 1802) ; The Hoop, 1 C.
Rob. 196, 165 Eng. Rep. R. 146 (Ga. 1799). Cf. Lindenberger Co. v. Lindenberger, Inc.,
235 Fed. 542 (W. D. Wash. 1916) (contract provided that English law governed).
95. Compare In re Badische Co., [1921] 2 Ch. 331.
96. McNair, supra note 16, at 209.
97. Daimler Co., Ltd. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co., [1916] 2 A. C. 307, 347,
approved in Stevenson & Sons, Ltd. v. Aktiengesellschaft ffir Cartonnagen-Industrie, [1918]
A. C. 239, 249.
98. See Ottoman Bank v. Jebara, [1928] A. C. 269, 276; cf. Tingley v. Muller, [1917]
2 Ch. 144, 156 (C. A.).
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Actually, the rule that executory contracts must be voided at the com-
mencement of war is not universal in England. It has been pointed out
that status-such as the contractual relationship of marriage 0 -- remains
unaffected by war and that a stockholder's contractual relationship with a
corporation would in all likelihood be held merely suspended if the question
came before an English court. 00 But the principal recognized exceptions
rest upon a famous dictum of Lord Dunedin in the Rio Tinto case. 1°1 It
reads as follows:
"There is indeed no such general proposition as that a state of war
avoids all contracts between subjects and enemies. Accrued rights are
not affected though the right of suing in respect thereof is suspended.
Further, there are certain contracts, particularly those which %ire
really the concomitants of rights of property, which even so far as
executory are not abrogated. Such as, for instance, the contract be-
tween landlord and tenant. . . . In other words, the executory con-
tract which is abrogated must either involve intercourse, or its con-
tinued existence must be in some other way against public policy as
that has been laid down in decided cases." 102
The case Lord Dunedin referred to is Halsey v. Lowenfeld,03 which held
that a lease to a non-resident alien enemy was neither terminated nor sus-
pended by the outbreak of war, and that the enemy could be sued for rent
during hostilities. A later case held that an irrevocable power of attorney
to sell land was not invalidated or suspended by a war which made the
donor of the power an enemy.10 4 It will be noted that the coupling of real
property with the contract is the key to these cases.Y05
The most recent reported British case on this general subject has led to a
considerable clarification of the law. Schering, A.G., a German corpora-
tion, had become indebted before the war to the Stockholms Enskilda Bank
of Sweden. Later, but also before the war, Schering, Ltd., the English sub-
sidiary of the German company, had entered into a contract with Stockholms
Enskilda Bank by which it became bound to discharge its parent's debt to
the Bank in instalments at stated times. When Schering, Ltd., failed to
pay the instalment which became due after the declaration of war between
99. McNair, spra note 16, at 199.
100. Id. at 198.
101. Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co., [1918] A. C. 260.
102. Id. at 269.
103. [1916] 2 K. B. 707 (C. A.).
104. Tingley v. Mfiller, [1917] 2 Ch. 144 (C. A.).
105. Compare McNair, supra note 16, at 199. One litigant made an unsuccessful at-
tempt to argue that a contract for the supply of iron ore over a period of 99 years was
analagous to a lease and should be treated as a "concomitant of the rights of property."
Fried. Krupp A. G. v. Orconera Iron Ore Co., 35 T. L. R. 234 (H. L., 1919).
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England and Germany, the Swedish bank brought suit. It was held in 1941
that the English company could not be permitted or required to discharge
its obligation during the period of hostilities, since payment would benefit
an enemy.106
In January, 1942, Schering, Ltd., brought an action against Stockholms
Enskilda Bank for a declaration that the contract had been abrogated by
the commencement of the war. The lower court held for the plaintiff, re-
jecting the contention that the contract %was, at most, suspended."" It was
recognized that the contract was with a neutral rather than an enemy; but
Simonds, J., proceeded on the theory that it was for the benefit of an enemy,
and also that its performance necessarily involved commercial intercourse
with an enemy. He pointed out that the enemy benefits not only from an
increase in his resources, but also from a decrease in ours; and went on to
say:
"It may be that there is a class of contract tie performance of which
is suspended and not abrogated by the outbreak of war, but I cannot
myself think of an example unless the contractual right is... a con-
comitant of a proprietary right 108 as for example a covenant to pay rent
may be a concomitant of a leasehold interest or unless the right is an
'accrued right' at the outbreak of war in the sense of a right accrued by
reason of a breach of contracL" '00
The decision rests at least in part on the theory that, since the Rio Tinto
case " holds that the parties themselves cannot suspend a contract for the
duration of the war by their own express language, a fortiori that
result could not be reached by "an artifice of the law." "
On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding that, in
effect, no obligation remained other than the payment of a debt." 2 The
contract would therefore be subject to the general rule covering agree-
ments wholly executed on one side, which are suspended rather than ter-
minated.
The court went farther, however, and carved out an exception from the
law on the ground that the contract in this case was with a neutral rather
than an enemy. This innovation finds no counterpart in the American
cases, and appears to be based on expediency rather than any logical dis-
tinction. To justify its apparent departure from precedent, the court point-
106. Stockholms Enskilda Bank v. Schering, Ltd., [1941]1 I. B. 424 (C. A.).
107. Schering, Ltd., v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 59 T. L. R. 203 (Ch. 1943).
108. Citing Lord Dunedin in Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co., [1918] A. C. 260,
quoted page ... , supra.
109. Schering, Ltd. v. Stockholms Ensildda Bank, 59 T. L. R. 203, 211 (Ch. 1943).
110. See note 101 supra.
111. Schering, Ltd. v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 59 T. L. R. 203 (Ch. 1943).
112. Schering, Ltd. v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, [1944] 1 Cl. 13 (C. A.).
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ed out that only one of the cases found by it in the reports 11 involved a
contract with a neutral as distinguished from contracts both parties to
which were enemies. Where the alien party is an enemy, the Master of the
Rolls stated, there is a necessary presumption that the assets of the enemy
country will be enhanced by the continued existence of the contract, and it
is therefore abrogated without further inquiry. On the other hand, where
the alien party is a neutral, it is necessary to determine whether or not the
enemy will actually receive any benefit from the continued existence of the
contract. "In cases where the outbreak of war compels the common law to
interfere with and control the performance of such contracts on the ground
of public policy the measure of interference ought not to exceed what is
required by the public interest in regard to the successful prosecution of
the war." 114
When the contract is with a neutral, the problem becomes a ques-
tion of fact as to whether performance will aid the enemy. In the
Schering case, this question was readily answered in the negative, for the
excellent reason that another court had already held payments under the
contract to be suspended for the duration." 5 The court also indicated that
a suspension clause in a contract with a neutral would be given effect even
though the contract was for the eventual benefit of an enemy." 0 It is curious
to note that the court apparently rejected the "present value of a post-war
benefit" theoryin so far as executory contracts with neutrals are concerned,
while simultaneously reiterating it with regard to contracts between
enemies.'
7
In any event, the English rule is now clear. When the executory contract
is with an enemy, there is a presumption that its continued existence will
enhance the enemy's resources, and the contract is therefore abrogated.
If an enemy is involved in the contract, but the actual alien party is a neu-
tral, the court must determine whether its performance will, in fact, be of
benefit to the enemy. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the
contract will be abrogated; if in the negative, the Schering case implies that
performance of the contract will be suspended for the duration. However,
barring the peculiar circumstance of another court decision holding the
contract suspended, it would seem that a negative answer would justify a
decision that the contract could be performed even during war-time. The
British distinction between cases involving neutrals and those involving
enemies may be useful in certain cases, but it has the obvious disadvantage
113, Esposito v. Bowden, 7 E. & B. 762, 119 Eng. Rep. R. 1930 (Q. B. 1857).
114. Schering, Ltd. v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, [1944] 1 Ch. 13, 23 (C. A.); ci.
Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272, 287-8 (1926), quoted page ... , supra.
115. Stockholms Enskilda Bank v. Schering, Ltd. [1941] 1 K. B. 424 (C. A.).
116. Schering, Ltd. v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, [1944] 1 Ch. 1 , 25 (C. A.).
117. Id. at 24.
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of requiring a detailed investigation of the entire transaction when a neu-
tral is a party to the contract.
CONCLUSION
The chief difference between the English and American law on the effect
of war on pre-existing contracts involving commercial relations with
enemy aliens is that in England these contracts are generally terminated
by the outbreak of war while in the United States, with some exceptions,
they are suspended. In cases involving contracts where tile alien party is a
neutral but an enerfty is involved, the British courts have recently evolved
an exception to their general rule, suspending rather than terminating such
contracts if the enemy will not benefit from its performance. American
courts depart from their general rule of suspension, and terminate the con-
tract, in two instances: where suspension would either thwart the inten-
tion of the parties, or interfere with the conduct of the war.
The relatively inflexible British rule has the advantage of furnishing
a definite guide to the contracting parties. This approach, however, ma
do utter violence to the true intent of the parties and far exceed the security
requirements of a nation at war. From a practical point of view, there
appears to be no difficulty in assuming that commercial contracts may be
entered into with full realization of the possibility of war and the distinct
intention to have all intercourse suspended upon its outbreak. but only until
such time as commercial relations between the warring nations may be re-
sumed. Numerous contracts are made to last for extremely long periods,"'
some even forever." 9 It seems reasonable to assume that the parties to such
contracts honestly intend them to outlast wars, just as they outlast human
lives. Courts should therefore attempt to give effect to the intention of the
parties, if it can be determined within the four corners of the contract or by
reasonable inference. If on this analysis suspension is found to be the proper
result, it should then become a question of fact whether the enemy will re-
ceive any direct or indirect benefit from the suspension of the contract. If
so, the court should hold suspension to be against public policy and the con-
tract therefore abrogated by the outbreak of war.
118. See United States v. Alba Pharmaceutical Co., Civ. No. 15-363 (S. D. N. Y.,
complaint filed Sept. 5, 1941) (contract for 50 years, renewable automatically in ten-year
periods thereafter); United States v. The Bayer Co., Civ. No. 15-364 (S. D. N. Y., com-
plaint filed Sept. 5, 1941) (same); Fried. Krupp A. G. v. Orconera Iron Ore Co., 35
T. L. P. 234 (H. L. 1919) (contract to supply iron ore for 99 years); [Am:;u,] I. G.
FARBEmNDusTnRm (1939) 56 (contract vith Riebeck'sche Montanwerhke effective April 1,
1925, to March 31, 2023; contract with Dynamit A. G. effective January 1, 1926, to De-
cember 31, 2024).
119. See United States v. Merck & Co., Civ. No. 3159 (D. N. J., complaint filed
October 28, 1943) ("treaty agreement" "in perpetuity"); FITZGER=a, INDusTra.L CoMi-
BUrATION IN ENGIAND (1927) 81 (agreement to supply chemicals in perpetuity).
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From the point of view of economic warfare, also, there are advantages
in considering executory contracts with enemies suspended rather than
abrogated. If the contracts remain in existence, the rights of the enemy
parties are available for seizure by the Alien Property Custodian. This has
actually occurred in a number of instances where United States companies
are the other contracting parties.120 The warring nation is thus in a posi-
tion to make whatever use of the enemy's contractual rights it deems advis-
able. If it appears desirable to terminate the contract, the Alien Property
Custodian can readily enter into negotiations toward that end. In the United
States, it is even possible to cancel such a contract withopit vesting the rights
of the enemy party in the Alien Property Custodian. Section 5 (b) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, as presently constituted, permits the Presi-
dent, during wartime or any other period of national emergency, to "nullify
. . . transactions involving any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest." 121 Hence, although the American rule
that contracts with enemies should generally be suspended grew up without
regard to modern techniques of economic warfare, it is the rule best suited
to modern conditions.
120. E.g,, the following Vesting Orders published in a single recent issue of the Federal
Register: Nos. 3678, 3679, 3680, 3682, 3684, 3685, 3686, 3690, 3691, 3692, 3693, 3694,
9 FED. REG. 7211-7216 (1944).
121. 55 STAT. 839 (1941); 50 U. S. C. App. § 5(b) (Supp. III, 1944); Alexewicz v.
General Aniline & Film Corp., 181 Misc. 181, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 713 (Sup. Ct. 1943)
(employment contract terminated under this provision). It should be noted that the
alien party need not be an enemy or ally of enemy to come within this section.
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